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R. v. Manigbas, 2026 ONSC 2868
R. v. Manigbas shows why bad character reasoning remains one of the most persistent — and dangerous — errors in sexual assault trials.
Joseph Neuberger, Michael Bury, and Diana Davison, Neuberger & Partners LLP, Toronto Criminal Lawyers
| CASE AT A GLANCE | |
|---|---|
| Citation | 2026 ONSC 2868 |
| Court | Ontario Superior Court of Justice |
| Original Conviction | December 2, 2024 — Sexual Assault |
| Outcome on Appeal | Conviction quashed — New trial ordered |
| Justice | P.T. Sugunasiri J. |
| Heard | January 27, 2026 |
01 • BACKGROUND
In November 2022, the complainant — identified only as TN — returned to her Toronto apartment from a trip and called her superintendent, Marcial Manigbas, to open the building’s storage room. She needed to store a suitcase and a mobile air conditioning unit. What happened inside her apartment in the minutes that followed became the subject of a criminal trial, an appeal, and now a fresh reckoning about the proper limits of credibility reasoning.
TN alleged that Manigbas, once inside her unit, grabbed her with his left arm, touched her genitals over her clothes with his right hand, and moved toward her chest — conduct lasting roughly a minute. He denied touching her at all, testifying he was there to disassemble the AC unit (a service he said was part of their agreement when he sold her the unit) and that he had in fact disassembled it before TN called him to say she had already moved everything herself.
Manigbas represented himself at trial, with amicus curiae assisting the court in cross-examining TN. The trial judge convicted him on December 2, 2024, accepting TN as a credible and reliable witness whose core account was unshaken. He appealed on three grounds: misapprehension of the evidence, uneven scrutiny of the respective accounts, and improper reliance on his bad character.
02 • WHAT THE TRIAL JUDGE DID
The trial judge’s written reasons reflect genuine care in many respects. She instructed herself on the W.(D.) framework regarding reasonable doubt, cautioned against myths and stereotypes about both complainants and accused persons in sexual assault cases, and engaged with the objective CCTV evidence Manigbas tendered.
Where the decision unravelled was in paragraph 43. There, the trial judge rejected Manigbas’ evidence partly because he had made disparaging remarks about TN — referring to her inability as a “lady” to handle the AC unit, speculating she would “make a mess or break something,” and making an insulting comment about TN’s appearance compared to a celebrity.
In isolation, these remarks were deeply unflattering. Manigbas came across as condescending and sexist. But the question for the trial judge was not whether he was a respectful person — it was whether he sexually assaulted TN on November 9, 2022.
“Bad character is not an offence known to the law. Discreditable disposition or character evidence, at large, creates nothing but ‘moral prejudice’ and the Crown is not entitled to ease its burden by stigmatizing the accused as a bad person.”
— R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, cited at para. 19
03 • THE CORE LEGAL ERROR
Justice Sugunasiri identified the error clearly: the trial judge’s reasons, read as a whole, suggest she rejected Manigbas’ denial of the sexual assault at least in part because of his misogynistic attitudes toward women generally and TN specifically. That is impermissible moral reasoning — it is the faulty logic that a man who holds contemptuous views of women must be the kind of man who would assault a woman and must, therefore, be disbelieved when he says he did not.
The law has long prohibited exactly this type of stereotypical or generalized reasoning ascribed to either gender. It is an error to use an accused’s bad character — whether tendered by the Crown or inadvertently exposed through the accused’s own testimony — as a propensity lever to decide guilt. The trial judge’s distaste for Manigbas’ attitudes, the appellate court found, coloured her credibility assessment in a way that rendered the verdict unsafe.
There was also a related problem in paragraph 40 of the trial decision. The judge had pointed to Manigbas’ assumption that TN needed help with her AC as supporting TN’s characterization that he did not respect her autonomy. But Justice Sugunasiri noted there was an innocent explanation the judge did not appear to engage with: Manigbas had helped TN with this specific, larger-than-average unit before, had disassembled it for her in prior years, and had previously moved it using a large dolly. His assumption that she needed help — however patronizing — had a mundane, non-sinister basis the trial judge did not address.
04 • WHY THIS DECISION MATTERS
This case sits at the intersection of two of the most sensitive areas in Canadian criminal law: sexual assault prosecutions and the rules governing character evidence. Courts have spent decades working to ensure that complainants in sexual assault cases are not subjected to illegitimate credibility attacks rooted in stereotypes. The same principle, however imperfectly acknowledged, must apply symmetrically.
An accused who testifies and reveals himself to be rude, dismissive, or even contemptibly sexist does not thereby forfeit the right to have his denial assessed on its legal merits. The question of whether someone committed a specific criminal act must be answered by reference to the evidence of that act — not by reference to the kind of person the trier of fact concludes they are.
Justice Sugunasiri was careful to note the trial judge’s diligence in other respects, particularly in refusing to admit separate bad character evidence that Manigbas attempted to tender as a self-represented accused. But the error in paragraph 43 was serious enough that the conviction could not stand.
05 • KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR PRACTITIONERS
| 1 | The bad character prohibition is not Crown-specific. Even where it is the accused — not the Crown — who puts unflattering character evidence before the court, the prohibition on moral prejudice reasoning applies with equal force. |
| 2 | Reasons must engage with innocent explanations. Where objective or uncontroverted evidence supports an innocent interpretation of the accused’s conduct, the trial judge must at minimum demonstrate awareness of that interpretation before rejecting it. |
| 3 | Credibility findings require particularization. Disliking a witness’s attitudes is not a legitimate basis for disbelieving their account of a specific event. Reasons must tie rejection of testimony to concrete reliability or credibility concerns about that testimony. |
| 4 | The W.(D.) framework does not insulate against appellate review. Properly instructing oneself on the legal test is necessary but not sufficient; the analysis must be free of legal error in its application. |
06 • WHAT HAPPENS NEXT
The appeal court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The complainant TN will have to testify again; Manigbas will face a fresh determination of the charges. The publication ban protecting TN’s identity remains in effect.
The outcome is not a finding of innocence — the Superior Court made no comment on what actually happened in TN’s apartment in November 2022. It is a finding that the process by which Manigbas was convicted was legally flawed, and that justice requires starting over.
That is, in the end, what the rules of evidence and the standards for credibility assessment exist to protect: not the reputations of accused persons, but the integrity of the process by which guilt is determined. When a trial judge — however understandably — lets revulsion at an accused’s character drive the analysis, the verdict becomes unstable, regardless of what the truth may be.
Note: Publication restriction applies — information identifying the complainant may not be published. Citation: R. v. Manigbas, 2026 ONSC 2868 (CanLII).
READ THE FULL DECISION HERE: R. v. Manigbas, 2026 ONSC 2868
Legal Commentary | R. v. Manigbas, 2026 ONSC 2868 | Ontario Superior Court of Justice | Released May 21, 2026
This post is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Neuberger & Partners LLP, Sexual Assault Defence Lawyers.
