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R. v. S.B.S., 2022 ONSC 2286
in the Context of Drug Dependency
Ontario Superior Court of Justice — Justice M.E. Vallee — May 2, 2022
Joseph Neuberger, Michael Bury, and Diana Davison, Neuberger & Partners LLP, Criminal Lawyers Toronto
I • INTRODUCTION
In R. v. S.B.S., the Ontario Superior Court of Justice considered whether a drug dealer who facilitated and financially benefited from the sex trade activities of three addicted women had, in law, committed the offences of human trafficking, exploitation, and procuring under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The case raised fundamental questions about the evidentiary threshold for these offences: specifically, the degree to which an accused must have exercised control, direction, or influence over a complainant’s movements, and the extent to which the exploitation of drug dependency can ground criminal liability for trafficking where the complainants themselves maintained meaningful decision-making autonomy over their sex trade activities.
The accused, S.B.S., was convicted of assault and assault with a weapon, having admitted to those offences at the outset of the proceedings. On the remaining counts — human trafficking (s. 279.01(1)), exploitation (s. 279.04(1)), procuring (s. 286.3(1)), and receiving a material benefit (ss. 279.02(1) and 286.2(1)) — Justice Vallee entered acquittals with respect to all three complainants. This commentary examines the reasoning underlying those acquittals, the evidentiary difficulties that constrained the analysis, and the legal principles the case illustrates.
II • FACTUAL BACKGROUND
S.B.S. operated as a drug dealer in Barrie, Ontario, conducting his business from residential properties commonly referred to as “trap houses.” He came to know each of the three complainants — A.S., J.W., and S.S. — through his drug-dealing activities. Each woman was addicted to controlled substances at the material time, and each became indebted to S.B.S. through the spotting of drugs — that is, the provision of drugs on credit against a promise of future repayment.
Each complainant provided sexual services for compensation during the period in question. The Crown’s theory was that S.B.S. deliberately cultivated relationships of economic dependency with these women by advancing drugs, allowing debts to accumulate, and then creating conditions in which sex trade work was the only available means of discharging those debts. The Crown further alleged that S.B.S. used violence and the threat of violence to enforce compliance and to collect the proceeds of that work.
S.B.S. acknowledged that he had assaulted both A.S. and J.W. With respect to the remaining allegations, he denied any involvement in the sex trade activities of the complainants, characterizing his relationship with each of them as that of a drug dealer and customer, and, in the case of J.W., an intimate partner.
A.S.
Had no prior history of sex trade work when she met S.B.S. in 2014. According to the statement she gave to police — admitted into evidence on the basis of necessity and threshold reliability, as she was unable to testify at trial — S.B.S. informed her that she would have to engage in sex work in order to finance her escalating drug use. She described a pattern of control that included extended physical confinement, threats with firearms, and repeated serious assaults. S.B.S. admitted to assaulting her on two occasions but denied any involvement in her sex trade activities.
J.W.
Was an experienced sex trade worker who had operated independently long before meeting S.B.S. She maintained full control of every aspect of her work, including the management of her advertising, the negotiation of services and rates, the scheduling of appointments, and the selection of clients. She described S.B.S. as her closest associate during the material period. Though she provided him with substantial sums of money — both to discharge drug debts and in response to demands he made when requiring funds to replenish his supply — she consistently maintained that she never considered herself to be working for S.B.S. and that he exercised no control over her sex trade activities. She described extensive domestic violence perpetrated by S.B.S., which she characterized as entirely separate from her professional activities.
S.S.
Was a heroin addict with no prior experience in the sex trade when she came into contact with S.B.S. She began purchasing drugs from him and subsequently incurred debts through spotting arrangements. She testified that the decision to enter the sex trade was her own, motivated by the financial pressure of her addiction, and acknowledged that other forms of remunerative work were available to her, though she felt constrained by her circumstances. She described an arrangement under which she remitted a portion of her earnings to S.B.S. to cover costs associated with advertising and accommodation. She did not consider herself to be working for S.B.S.
III • APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
| OFFENCES IN ISSUE | |
|---|---|
| Human Trafficking s. 279.01(1) |
Every person who recruits, transports, transfers, receives, holds, conceals or harbours a person, or exercises control, direction or influence over the movements of a person, for the purpose of exploiting them or facilitating their exploitation. The Crown relied on the limb dealing with control, direction, or influence over the complainants’ movements. A drug dealer who sells to a sex trade worker does not, by that fact alone, become a trafficker — the Crown must prove the accused took advantage of the complainant’s dependency to achieve the purpose of having her perform sexual acts: R. v. Mohylov, 2019 ONSC 1269, at para. 39. |
| Exploitation s. 279.04(1) |
Causing a person to provide, or offer to provide, labour or a service by engaging in conduct that, in all the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause that person to believe that her safety or the safety of a person known to her would be threatened if she failed to provide the labour or service. The standard requires the complainant to have held a reasonable belief of threat to safety arising from the accused’s conduct. |
| Procuring s. 286.3(1) |
Criminalizes procurement of a person to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, and the exercise of control, direction, or influence over the movements of such a person, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under s. 286.1(1). The Crown must establish that the accused intentionally caused, induced, or persuaded a complainant to offer or provide sexual services for consideration: R. v. Deutch, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 2, at para. 32. |
IV • ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S REASONING
Justice Vallee’s acquittals with respect to J.W. and S.S. were grounded in the evidence of the complainants themselves. In the case of J.W., the court accepted her unequivocal testimony that she had managed her own sex trade business independently both before and after meeting S.B.S., that S.B.S. played no role in the organization or conduct of that work, and that she never regarded herself as working for or under the direction of S.B.S. While the court accepted that J.W. feared physical violence from S.B.S. when she owed him money and declined to work, the violence she described was contextually connected to their domestic relationship rather than to any exercise of control over her professional activities. In the absence of proof that S.B.S. exercised control, direction, or influence over J.W.’s movements for the purpose of exploitation, the first essential element of the trafficking offence was not established.
With respect to S.S., the court’s analysis was similarly constrained by her own evidence. S.S. testified candidly that her decision to enter the sex trade was self-determined, that alternative means of earning income were available to her, and that S.B.S. had not directed or required her to engage in sex work. The court found that S.B.S.’s involvement — permitting his telephone to be used for advertising and facilitating the placement of an advertisement — amounted to facilitation of a business S.S. had chosen to enter, rather than the exercise of control or direction over her movements for the purpose of exploitation.
The acquittal in relation to A.S. was analytically more complex. A.S.’s statement to police described conduct by S.B.S. that, if accepted, would have been capable of establishing both control over her movements and exploitation within the meaning of s. 279.04(1). She described being expressly told by S.B.S. that she would have to engage in sex work to fund her drug use, being physically confined for extended periods, and being subjected to serious and repeated violence, including threats made with firearms.
However, A.S. was unable to testify at trial and could not be subjected to cross-examination. Her statement was admitted on grounds of necessity and threshold reliability, but those circumstances required the court to approach her evidence with heightened caution. That caution was further warranted by the direct contradiction of her evidence by J.W., whose testimony the court found to be credible and reliable, and who had no discernible motive to misrepresent the facts. J.W., who was present with S.B.S. for the great majority of the material period, testified that A.S. had never in fact worked in the sex trade — that she had been too frightened to do so and had instead resorted to theft to fund her drug use.
In the face of that contradiction from a credible and cross-examined witness, the court was unable to find, on the evidence available, that the Crown had established beyond a reasonable doubt that S.B.S. had exercised control, direction, or influence over A.S.’s movements for the purpose of exploitation. The acquittal was accordingly entered.
The Crown sought the admission of the evidence of each complainant as similar fact evidence in support of the accounts of the others, relying on the framework established in R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56. The Crown’s submission was that the accused’s conduct displayed a sufficiently consistent pattern — in particular, the establishment of relationships of drug dependency followed by exploitation through sex trade work — to lend mutual credibility to the three accounts.
Justice Vallee declined to apply the similar fact evidence doctrine on the ground that the complainants’ accounts were not, in the relevant respect, similar. The doctrine operates by rendering an unlikely coincidence still less likely through the accumulation of similar allegations; it is therefore premised on the accounts in question being materially consistent. Here, however, the accounts diverged on the most significant factual issue: the degree to which S.B.S. had exercised control over the complainants’ sex trade activities. A.S. described direct instruction and compulsion, while J.W. and S.S. both stated affirmatively that S.B.S. had not required or directed them to engage in sex work. The evidence of J.W. and S.S. was not merely non-corroborative of A.S.’s account — it actively contradicted it. In those circumstances, the similar fact doctrine had no proper application.
V • SIGNIFICANCE AND OBSERVATIONS
The decision in R. v. S.B.S. illustrates two principles of enduring importance in the prosecution of trafficking and exploitation offences.
First — Drug dependency alone is not trafficking
The existence of a relationship of drug dependency between an accused and a complainant who provides sexual services does not, without more, establish the elements of trafficking or exploitation. The Crown must demonstrate that the accused took advantage of the dependency to compel sexual services — as distinct from simply benefiting from choices independently made by the complainant. The trafficking and exploitation provisions are directed at the structure of coercive control, not at the broader circumstances of economic and social disadvantage within which sex trade work frequently occurs.
Second — A complainant’s own characterization of her situation matters
Where a complainant testifies that she exercised autonomous control over her sex trade activities and did not regard herself as being directed or controlled by the accused, that evidence is not easily overcome, even in the context of a relationship marked by violence and economic coercion. This reflects the legislative acknowledgment, codified in s. 279.01(2), that consent to the underlying activity is not a defence to trafficking; however, where a complainant maintains that she was not subject to control or direction at all, the absence of the first essential element of the offence remains dispositive.
The particular difficulty posed by A.S.’s situation — where the accused’s admitted conduct and the complainant’s account suggested a degree of control that could not be adequately tested in cross-examination and was contradicted by a credible third-party witness — underscores the challenges that arise in the prosecution of offences committed in environments characterized by pervasive drug use, impaired recollection, and reluctance to engage with legal proceedings. The court was not in a position to find the first essential element of the trafficking offence established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the acquittal followed as a matter of legal necessity rather than an assessment of the accused’s moral culpability.
VI • CONCLUSION
The decision in R. v. S.B.S. serves as a useful illustration of the evidentiary demands of the trafficking and exploitation provisions of the Criminal Code. The court’s careful and thorough analysis of each complainant’s evidence, considered individually and in relation to the evidence as a whole, reflects the application of the standard principles governing the assessment of credibility, reliability, and reasonable doubt in the context of offences involving complex relational dynamics and vulnerable complainants.
The acquittals on the trafficking, exploitation, and procurement counts do not diminish the seriousness of the accused’s admitted conduct, for which he was duly convicted. They reflect, rather, the precision with which the criminal law defines the threshold between conduct that attracts liability for these particular offences and conduct — however morally reprehensible — that falls outside their scope. That precision is an essential feature of a system committed to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the condition of criminal punishment.
Case Commentary | R. v. S.B.S., 2022 ONSC 2286 | Ontario Superior Court of Justice | May 2, 2022
This commentary is intended for general informational and educational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.
